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CASENOTE
PARKER V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA: PUTTING THE
"I'S" IN MILITIA
I. INTRODUCTION
The meaning of the Second Amendment is argued passionately
among interest groups and often touted by the American public,
but until recently, it has not caused much controversy in the
courts.1 Unlike the textual structure of other amendments in the
Bill of Rights, the Second Amendment contains a statement of
purpose ("[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to the secu-
rity of a free State") before its guarantee ("the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed").2 Prior to 2001,
the federal circuits were well-settled that this construction indi-
cated that the Framers' only intent was to ensure a state's ability
to maintain an effective state militia without federal infringe-
ment, rather than to confer an individual right to bear arms.3 But
in the midst of a recent individual rights trend in Second
Amendment scholarship, the difficulty in determining how these
1. See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104
YALE L.J. 995, 997-98 (1995) ("Oddly enough, this often-rancorous exchange has long been
neglected by those to whom we normally turn for constitutional interpretation: the legal
academy and the courts, particularly the U.S. Supreme Court.") (reviewing JOYCE LEE
MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (1994)).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. II; Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 793 (1998) (internal citation omitted).
3. See Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1063 & n.ll (9th Cir. 2003) (listing the cir-
cuits that follow the states' right to a militia view, or collective rights view). In 2001, the
Fifth Circuit overturned sixty-two years of precedent when it found that the Second
Amendment did confer an individual right to bear arms. United States v. Emerson, 270
F.3d 203, 264 (5th Cir. 2001).
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two clauses fit together has risen to the forefront of constitutional
jurisprudence.'
Procedural ambiguities exist in addition to the substantive
question of what rights the Second Amendment protects. Since
the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, the issue of whether
the Second Amendment even applies to state action or if states
can freely restrict firearms, while the federal government cannot,
has yet to be resolved.5 And even if states are bound by the Sec-
ond Amendment, parties attempting to invoke individual rights
often argue that they have been injured by gun control laws even
before being prosecuted for violations.6 Whether these plaintiffs
can be heard depends largely on how courts define standing for
pre-emptive harm.7
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit's recent decision in Parker v. District of Columbia at-
tempted to resolve these questions by revisiting the amendment's
text and enactment history, consulting scholarship trends, and
taking note of the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States v. Em-
erson.' The Parker court held that the Second Amendment does
protect an individual's right to bear arms.9 Part II of this note ex-
plores the history of the Second Amendment, compares argu-
ments supporting the collective rights theory to the recent schol-
arly trend reversing that long held viewpoint, and explains the
judicial precedent in place prior to Parker. Part III presents the
factual and procedural background of the Parker decision. Part IV
examines the majority and dissenting opinions. Finally, Part V
4. See Adam Liptak, A Liberal Case for the Individual Right to Own Guns Helps
Sway the Federal Judiciary, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2007, at A18 (noting previous "scholarly
and judicial consensus that the Second Amendment protects only a collective right" and
the dilution of that majority opinion over the last twenty years).
5. See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1066 n.17; Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second
Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291, 296 (2000) (explaining that the Sec-
ond Amendment has yet to be expressly applicable to the states).
6. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 374-75 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (explain-
ing that plaintiffs were bringing pre-enforcement challenges to the District's gun laws and
comparing plaintiffs to those in an "almost identical" position in Seegars v. Gonzales (cit-
ing Seegars v. Gonzales, 396 F.3d 1248, 1255-56 (D.C. Cir. 2005))).
7. See id. (suggesting that the D.C. Circuit Court could-and perhaps should-
overrule its stance on pre-enforcement challenges in order to align more closely with the
relaxed requirements found in Supreme Court decisions, Babbitt v. United Farm Workers
National Union and Virginia v. American Booksellers Association (citing Babbitt, 442 U.S.
289, 298 (1979); Am. Booksellers, 484 U.S. 383, 393 (1988))).
8. See id. at 378-81 (citing Emerson, 270 F.3d at 264-65 (5th Cir. 2001)).
9. Id. at 395.
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discusses the possible impacts of Parker and the likelihood that
the Supreme Court will grant certiorari.
II. HISTORY
A. Interpreting the Framers' Second Amendment
In 1791, the First Congress adopted the Second Amendment to
quell Anti-federalist concerns regarding the federal government's
Article I powers.1" As a stipulation to ratifying the Constitution,
Anti-federalists demanded a safeguard that would protect a s-
tate's right to organize militias and defend itself if a tyrannical
government abused the power to raise standing armies. 1' How-
ever, the wording of the amendment and the history surrounding
its enactment make it unclear whether the Framers had intended
to reserve an individual right to bear arms beyond this federalism
issue. 12
Modern interpretations resolving the individual rights ambigu-
ity of the Second Amendment fall into three categories-the "col-
lective rights" model, the "traditional individual rights" theory,
and a variant of the two called the "limited individual rights" or
"sophisticated collective rights" theory.'3 The collective rights
10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12, 15, 16 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To
raise and support Armies... To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of
the Union ... To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia"); Doff, su-
pra note 5, at 310 ("To the extent that opponents of ratification worried about arms, their
principal concern was that the federal government would establish a standing army. Rati-
fication was obtained through a bargain."); see also David Yassky, The Second Amend-
ment: Structure, History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588, 667 (2000)
(explaining that many Founders believed "state militias were preferable to a federal
army").
11. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 390 ("Federalists relied on the existence of an armed popu-
lace to deflect Antifederalist criticism that a strong federal government would lead to op-
pression and tyranny. Antifederalists acknowledged the argument, but insisted that an
armed populace was not enough and that the existence of a popular militia should also be
guaranteed."); Dorf, supra note 5, at 311 ("[T]he Second Amendment was intended to pro-
tect the states' right of organized resistance to federal tyranny.").
12. See Dorf, supra note 5, at 311-12 (arguing that the Framers' concern about stand-
ing armies was more about federal control over the states, rather than ensuring an indi-
vidual right). But see Volokh, supra note 2, at 810 (arguing that the First, Fourth, Ninth,
and Tenth Amendments secure individual rights, which "suggests that 'the right of the
people to bear arms' refers to a right of individuals" as well).
13. Parker, 478 F.3d at 379; Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052, 1060 (9th Cir. 2003);
Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 1, at 1000-03.
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model does not recognize an individual right to bear arms and
therefore permits both state and federal governments to strongly
restrict firearm use. 14 The traditional theory asserts that "indi-
vidual private citizens [have] a fundamental right to possess and
use firearms for any purpose at all, subject only to limited gov-
ernment regulation."15 The sophisticated collective rights model
supports the idea that "individuals maintain a constitutional
right to possess firearms insofar as such possession bears a rea-
sonable relationship to militia service." 6 Application of the so-
phisticated collective rights model renders an almost identical re-
sult as the collective rights model because most proponents do not
recognize a modern "militia" akin to the one contemplated by the
Framers. 7 Currently, the majority of courts recognize the collec-
tive rights theory as the most salient."1
14. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060. Collective rights theorists put significant weight on the
purpose clause of the Second Amendment and assert that the goal of a "well-regulated mi-
litia" strongly indicates that the Framers' only intent was to "maintain state militias
against federal encroachment." Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 1, at 1000. This theory is
often considered to be a result-based argument aimed at supporting the contemporary de-
sire to control gun violence. See id. at 1003.
15. Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060. Traditional theorists purport that the ability to arm
oneself was a preexisting right and that the Bill of Rights only secured its preservation.
See Parker, 478 F.3d at 382 (citing Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan, Bringing
Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in the
Way?, 75 N.C. L. REV. 781, 890 (1997)); see also Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281
(1897) ("[Tlhe Bill of Rights[ ] were not intended to lay down any novel principles of gov-
ernment, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inherited
from our English ancestors . . . ."). Also indicative of the Framers' intent to reserve an in-
dividual right is the ease with which the Framers could have expressed that their only in-
tention was to protect ability of militias to organize. See Sanford Levinson, The Embar-
rassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 644-45 (1989) ("[O]ne might ask why the
Framers did not simply say something like 'Congress shall have no power to prohibit
state-organized and directed militias."').
16. See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1060.
17. Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 1, at 1003 ("Because the militia of the whole has
essentially disappeared, then the individual right has ceased to exist.").
18. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 380; see also Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp.
2d 103, 107 (D.D.C. 2004) (citing federal circuit cases upholding the collective rights the-
ory), rev'd, 478 F.3d 370 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Sandidge v. United States, 520 A.2d 1057, 1058
(D.C. 1987) (explaining that the court's holding follows precedents of "numerous other
courts" recognizing collective rights instead of an individual right).
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B. Legislative History Depicting the Second Amendment's
Application
1. The Supreme Court's Decision in United States v. Miller
Supports a Collective Rights Theory
In 1939, the Supreme Court held that possession of a short-
barreled shotgun had no relation to the "preservation or efficiency
of a well regulated militia" and therefore "the Second Amendment
[does not] guarantee[ ] the right to keep and bear such an in-
strument."19 Although the Court did not take a firm stand on the
broader question of individual rights, the majority of circuits have
read this decision not as conferring an individual right, but in-
stead supporting a collective rights theory.2" An alternative read-
ing of Miller proposes that the decision distinguishes certain
weapons as unrelated to militias and therefore only these weap-
ons are beyond the scope of the Second Amendment's protection.21
Most courts have avoided this alternative interpretation and es-
cape the "perverse result that the deadlier a firearm is, the more
likely it is to receive constitutional protection-because the mili-
tary, of course, prefers weapons that are as efficient and effective
at killing as possible."22 The Supreme Court has twice declined to
reconsider its position, leaving lower courts with little guidance
beyond Miller.23
19. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939).
20. See, e.g., Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1061 ("As a result of its phrasing of its holding in
the negative, however, the Miller Court's opinion stands only for the proposition that the
possession of certain weapons is not protected, and offers little guidance as to what rights
the Second Amendment does protect .... What Miller does strongly imply, however, is that
the Supreme Court rejects the traditional individual rights view."); see also Yassky, supra
note 10, at 665-67 (explaining that the Miller case does not provide much clarity to the
Second Amendment, but does rule out the Libertarian [traditional individual rights] ap-
proach).
21. See Yassky, supra note 10, at 666 (explaining that revisionists "read Miller as
holding merely that certain weapons are beyond the reach of Second Amendment protec-
tion").
22. Id. at 666; see Sandidge, 520 A.2d at 1058-59 ("Given the destructive capabilities
of modern weaponry, it is inconceivable ...that Congress may only regulate weapons
which have no possible relationship to the common defense today.").
23. See Parker, 311 F. Supp. 2d at 105.
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2. The Fifth Circuit Interprets the Second Amendment as
Conferring an Individual Right
Sixty-two years after Miller, the Fifth Circuit concluded in
United States v. Emerson that Miller was being read too nar-
rowly, and that the Framers did intend to protect the individual
right to bear arms.24 The Fifth Circuit disposed of the dominant
interpretation of Miller by finding that the Supreme Court did
not actually agree with the government's collective rights argu-
ment.25 Instead, the Fifth Circuit believed the Miller Court ruled
in the government's favor via their second theory-that the
amendment only protects "those weapons which are ordinarily
used for military or public defense purposes .... "26 Because the
Miller Court determined that "[s]awed-off shotguns . . . are
clearly weapons which can have no legitimate use in the hands of
private individuals," Miller's rights were not infringed by the
law.27
Once the Fifth Circuit determined that Miller did not actually
void the individual rights theory, the court held that plain inter-
pretations of the text and historical material from the time of en-
actment actually proved that the individual rights model was cor-
rect.2" The court believed that the "right of the people to bear
arms" applied to individuals, not states, because everywhere else
in the Constitution the word "people" is used to confer an individ-
ual right.29 Likewise, the court determined that "bear arms" was
24. 270 F.3d 203, 264 (5th Cir. 2001). Emerson involved an estranged husband who
was issued a restraining order for threatening his wife. Id. at 211. After the order was is-
sued, Mr. Emerson was found carrying a Beretta pistol in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(8), which prohibits any person subject to a restraining order from shipping inter-
state or receiving an interstate shipped firearm. Id. at 211-13. Mr. Emerson claimed that
§ 922(g)(8) infringed on his Second Amendment rights. Id. at 212.
25. See id. at 224.
26. Id. at 222, 224.
27. Id. at 223-24 (quoting Brief for Appellant at 20-21, 307 U.S. 174 (No. 696), 1939
WL 48353).
28. See id. at 224-25, 260.
29. Id. at 227-28 (noting several instances in the constitutional articles and amend-
ments where the Framers necessarily chose to use the word "state" instead of the confus-
ing terminology, "the people," when describing the collective body of state citizens). In
support of this reading, the Fifth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's decision in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, which held that the First, Second, Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth
Amendments refer to a class of people to whom rights and powers are preserved. Id. at 228
(citing United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990)).
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not limited to military use,3 ° and "keep arms" did not suggest this
use at all.3 ' The amendment's purpose statement for a "well-
regulated militia" did not impede the court's interpretation be-
cause the textual guarantee was clear, and because the Framers
understood militias to encompass nearly the entire population.32
By conferring a right to arm the militias, the intent was to give
each person a right to arm himself.33 The historical perspective
reinforced the court's textual determinations.3 4 Despite determin-
ing that the federal statute did not violate Mr. Emerson's rights
because it had a legitimate aim to protect public safety, the Fifth
Circuit held that the Second Amendment confers an individual
right. 5
30. See id. at 230-32 (explaining that at least ten early state constitutions "reflect[
that under common usage 'bear arms' was in no sense restricted to bearing arms in mili-
tary service").
31. Id. at 232 (stating that it was undisputed by both appellants and appellees that
"keep arms" has a non-military connotation).
32. See id. at 233-35 (holding that the preamble to the Second Amendment alone can-
not confer a collective rights theory because "such an interpretation is contrary to the
plain meaning of the text of the guarantee, its placement within the Bill of Rights and the
wording of the other articles thereof and of the original Constitution as a whole"). The
Court noted that "'Militia'... was understood to be composed of the people generally pos-
sessed of arms which they knew how to use, rather than to refer to some formal military
group separate and distinct from the people at large." Id. at 235.
33. Id. at 235 (explaining that "Madison saw an armed people as a foundation of the
militia which would provide security for a 'free' state, one which ... was not afraid to trust
its people to have their own arms") (discussing THE FEDERALIST No. 46 (James Madison)).
Madison's view is instructive because he was instrumental in creating the Amendment.
Id. at 240 n.53.
34. The Emerson court could not find any historical material contradicting its inter-
pretation of the text which indicated it had formulated the appropriate viewpoint. Id. at
236. The court emphasized state ratifications of the Constitution and their demands to
create a Bill of Rights containing a provision for the people's right to bear arms. See id. at
241-44 (listing eight state constitutional convention proposals for adding certain individ-
ual rights to the Constitution). The court also noted that "the Federalists' favorite 1787-88
talking point[ ]" responding to the state demands "was to remind the Anti-federalists that
the American people were armed and hence could not possibly be placed in danger by a
federal standing army or federal control over the militia." Id. at 259. Further, newspapers
and letters written after the adoption of the Bill of Rights supported the Emerson court's
view of individual rights. Id. at 260. Overall, the court was "struck by the absence of any
indication that the result contemplated by the sophisticated collective rights view was de-
sired, or even conceived of, by anyone" and therefore aligned its holding with the individ-
ual rights theory. Id. at 260 n.60.
35. See id. at 264-65 (stating that "the predicate order in question here is sufficient,
albeit likely minimally so, to support the deprivation... of the defendant's Second Amend-
ment rights").
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3. Among the Federal Circuits, the Fifth Circuit Stands Alone in
Conferring an Individual Right
Prior to the D.C. Circuit's decision in Parker, the Fifth Circuit
was the only federal appellate court to protect a Second Amend-
ment individual right to bear arms.3' All other circuits have
adopted some form of the collective rights theory and have never
recognized that a federal or state law infringed on an individual
right.37 However, in 2001 the Department of Justice adopted the
individual rights model.38
III. BACKGROUND OF THE PARKER CASE
In response to an increasing number of "gun-related deaths
and crimes," Washington, D.C. passed the Firearms Control
36. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 380 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also su-
pra note 18 and accompanying text. The Parker court also noted that "[sitate appellate
courts . . .offer a more balanced picture" with "at least seven [holding] that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right," while "at least ten state appellate courts (in-
cluding the District of Columbia) have endorsed the collective rights position." Parker, 478
F.3d at 380 & n.61 (citations omitted).
37. See United States v. Price, 328 F.3d 958, 961 (7th Cir. 2003) (agreeing with a pre-
vious collective rights holding despite defendant's petition for the court to review persua-
sive authority in Emerson and Attorney General John Ashcroft's letter to the National Ri-
fle Association); Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1087 (asserting that "the collective rights view,
rather than the individual rights models, reflects the proper interpretation of the Second
Amendment"); Gillespie v. City of Indianapolis, 185 F.3d 693, 711 (7th Cir. 1999) (requir-
ing the defendant to "demonstrate a 'reasonable relationship' between his own inability to
carry a firearm and 'the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia') (quoting
United States v. Miller, 309 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)); United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265,
1273 (11th Cir. 1997) ("The Second Amendment was inserted into the Bill of Rights to pro-
tect the role of the states in maintaining and arming the militia"); United States v. Rybar,
103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996) (requiring the defendant to "demonstrate[ I that his pos-
session of the machine guns had any connection with militia-related activity"); Love v.
Pepersack, 47 F.3d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[T]he amendment does not confer an abso-
lute individual right to bear any type of firearm."); United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016,
1020 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The purpose of the Second Amendment is to restrain the federal
government from regulating the possession of arms where such regulation would interfere
with the preservation or efficiency of the militia."); United States v. Oakes, 564 F.2d 384,
387 (10th Cir. 1977) ("To apply the amendment so as to guarantee appellant's right to
keep an unregistered firearm which had not been shown to have any connection to the mi-
litia ... would be unjustifiable in terms of either logic or policy."); United States v. Warin,
530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir. 1976) ("It is clear that the Second Amendment guarantees a
collective rather than an individual right."); Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 921 (1st
Cir. 1942) ("The right to keep and bear arms is not a right conferred upon the people by
the federal constitution.").
38. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 380 (citing Memorandum from Attorney Gen. John
Ashcroft to All United States' Attorneys (November 9, 2001)).
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Regulation Act of 1975."9 The portions of the Act at issue in Park-
er were codified as two statutes. The first prohibited any new reg-
istrations of firearms after September 24, 1976,40 and the second
mandated that all legally registered firearms be kept unloaded
and disassembled or locked.41 The third statute at issue in Parker
was passed by Congress in 1932 and required that an individual
have a license to carry a concealed weapon.4 2 The federal statute
was later codified as section 22-4504 of the D.C. Code and
amended in 1994 to include pistols.4 3 Section 22-4504 had the
breadth to punish an individual who carries a firearm within his
or her home." Together the three statutes prohibited registering,
loading, assembling, and carrying handguns-essentially a total
ban on handgun ownership.
Six plaintiffs disputed D.C. Code sections 7-2502, 7-2507.02,
and 22-4504 as infringing on their Second Amendment right to
possess firearms for self-defense.4 5 They first brought their griev-
39. Brief of Defendants-Appellees at 3, Parker, 478 F.3d 370 (No. 04-7041), 2006 WL
2187169 (explaining that "handguns had been used in 155 of 285 murders (54%) in
1974 ... 88% of robberies and 91% of assaults .. . [and] [a]ll rapes involving firearms" in
the District (citing Firearms Control Regulations Act of 1975: Hearing on H. Con. Res. 694
Before the Comm. on the District of Columbia, 94th Cong. 24, 26 (1976))).
40. D.C. CODE § 7-2502.02 (2001). This registration prohibition statute contains an
exception allowing special police officers to register and possess firearms for use during
their employment hours and for retired Metropolitan police officers to register and possess
firearms at their homes. Id. § 7-2502.02(a)(4).
41. Id. § 7-2507.02. There is no exception outside active law enforcement for the D.C.
CODE § 7-2507.02 requirement to keep firearms unloaded and disassembled. See id. § 7-
2502.01(b)(1).
42. Brief of Defendants-Appellees, supra note 39, at 4 (citing Act of July 8, 1932, Pub.
L. No. 72-275, 47 Stat. 650 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE § 22-4504 (2001))).
43. D.C. CODE § 22-4504 (2001 & Supp. 2007).
44. See Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 400 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("§ 22-4504
appear[s] to ban moving a handgun from room to room in one's own house, even if one
has lawfully registered the firearm (an interpretation the District does not dispute)."). Ex-
ceptions to the concealed weapon license requirement are listed in § 22-4505 and include
law enforcement personnel and other special agents. D.C. CODE § 22-4505 (Supp. 2007).
Additionally, § 22-4506 allows the District of Columbia's Chief of Police to issue temporary
permits if circumstances necessitate a concealed weapon. D.C. CODE § 22-4506 (2001 &
Supp. 2007).
45. The six plaintiffs included District residents Shelly Parker, Tracey Ambeau, Tom
G. Palmer, George Lyon, Gillian St. Lawrence, and Dick Heller. Parker, 478 F.3d at 373-
74. Their respective complaints, as explained by the court, are as follows:
Shelly Parker, Travey Ambeau, Tom G. Palmer, and George Lyon want to
posses handguns in their respective homes for self-defense. Gillian St. Law-
rence owns a registered shotgun, but wishes to keep it assembled and unhin-
dered by a trigger lock or similar device. Finally, Dick Heller, who is a Dis-
trict of Columbia special police officer permitted to carry a handgun on duty
2008]
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ances to the D.C. District Court, where the case was dismissed on
the determination that the Second Amendment does not confer
"an individual right to bear arms separate and apart from service
in the Militia." 46 The district court's analysis adhered to the
dominant interpretation of United States v. Miller that there is no
individual right to bear arms and rejected the theory that Miller
only intended to define the weapons covered by the amendment.47
The court recognized the Fifth Circuit's decision in United States
v. Emerson as an outlier that improperly expanded Miller and
"brushed aside" contrary Fifth Circuit precedent.48
In a two-to-one panel decision, the D.C. Circuit Court reversed
and remanded to the district court with instructions to grant
summary judgment in favor of one plaintiff, Dick Heller. 49 Be-
cause the court was not convinced that any precedent could
squarely dictate whether the Second Amendment provides for a
collective or individual right, the majority went beyond case law
to examine the amendment's text and other historical documenta-
tion.5" The court held that the Second Amendment did provide for
an individual right, and found the disputed D.C. gun laws uncon-
stitutional. 1 The dissenting opinion argued that, under Miller,
the district court's decision should have been easily affirmed be-
cause the Second Amendment was meant to safeguard a state's
ability to raise a militia and therefore does not apply to districts,
which are non-states.52
as a guard at the Federal Judicial Center, wishes to possess one at his home.
Heller applied for and was denied a registration certificate to own a handgun.
Id.
46. Parker v. District of Columbia, 311 F. Supp. 2d 103, 109 (D.D.C. 2004).
47. See id.
48. See id. at 106-07. The court noted that it does not "place a great deal of reliance
on the stability of Emerson even within the Fifth Circuit." Id. at 107.
49. Parker, 478 F.3d at 373, 401. The court did not grant standing for the five other
plaintiffs because there was no imminent prosecution against them and therefore they
could not prove injury-in-fact. See id. at 375 ("[W]e are obliged to look for an allegation
that appellants here have been singled out or uniquely targeted by the D.C. government
for prosecution. No such allegation has been made.").
50. See id. at 380-81.
51. Id. at 395, 401.
52. Id. at 404 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF PARKER'S MAJORITY AND
DISSENTING OPINIONS
A. Majority Opinion
1. Standing Is Only Conferred to Plaintiffs with Injuries-in-Fact
or in Danger of Imminent Prosecution
The Parker court dismissed five of the six plaintiffs because
they could not establish injury-in-fact, and therefore lacked
standing to bring their complaints.53 Relying on D.C. Circuit
cases Navegar, Inc. v. United States54 and Seegars v. Gonzales,"
the court determined that the "plaintiffs were required to show
that the District had singled them out for [imminent] prosecu-
tion" rather than just showing a general threat of punishment for
future violations of D.C. gun control laws.56 The case brought by
the five dismissed plaintiffs was almost identical to the plaintiffs
in Seegars, who were also contesting the D.C. gun control laws
and likewise were not granted standing because they could not
show injury beyond the apprehension of prosecution. 7 The Parker
majority explained that the Supreme Court has allowed much
more relaxed standing requirements when faced with a "pre-
enforce-ment challenge to a criminal statute that allegedly
threatened constitutional rights,"5 5 but that it must adhere to its
decisions in Navegar and Seegars until there is an en banc deci-
sion overruling these cases.59
One of the six Parker plaintiffs, Dick Heller, was granted
standing because he applied for and was denied a gun license.6 °
Following D.C. Circuit precedent, the court determined that the
53. See id. at 375. The majority opinion was written by Senior Judge Silberman, who
was joined by Judge Griffith. Id. at 373.
54. 103 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Navegar involved gun manufacturers who could not
obtain standing under a pre-enforcement claim because their products merely fit the de-
scription of semi-automatic weapons, rather than being listed explicitly in the statute, as
required for manufacturers to whom the court did grant standing. Id. at 1001.
55. 396 F.3d 1248 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
56. Parker, 478 F.3d at 374.
57. See id. (citing Seegars, 396 F.3d at 1255-56).
58. See id. at 374-75 (construing Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat'l Union, 442
U.S. 289, 298-99 (1979)).
59. Id. at 375.
60. Id. at 375-76.
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denial of a license "constitutes an injury independent of the Dis-
trict's prospective enforcement of its gun laws" and that could
possibly infringe on Heller's rights.61 The court also allowed
Heller's other claims challenging section 22-4504 (carrying a gun)
and section 7-2507.02 (keeping guns disassembled) to stand de-
spite lacking a concrete injury.6 2 The District argued that using
the licensing cases to confer standing was misplaced because the
gun laws constituted a complete ban on ownership.63 According to
the District, there was no theoretical opportunity for licensing, so
a license denial could not be an injury.6 4 The court rejected this
argument and determined that the gun laws did not completely
ban registration and therefore Heller's denial was a distinct in-
jury.65 Finally, the court firmly established Heller's standing to
proceed with his case by reciting Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit
Court opinions which asserted that standing must be decided be-
fore examining the legal merits of a claim.66
2. The Second Amendment Protects an Individual Right to Keep
and Bear Arms
The D.C. Circuit's analysis of the Second Amendment's text is
similar to the Fifth Circuit's approach in Emerson.67 The Parker
court put significant emphasis on evaluating the words "the draft-
ers chose to describe the holders of the right-'the people."'68 Be-
cause "the people" is used to describe the holders of the First,
Fourth, Ninth, and Tenth Amendment's individual rights, it fol-
61. Id. at 376.




65. Id. The court reasoned that there was not a complete ban because retired police
officers could register handguns and because not all types of guns were banned. Id.
66. Id. at 377. The D.C. Circuit's analysis of the standing-before-merits issue discred-
its the Ninth Circuit's approach in Silveira v. Lockyer. See id. at 376-77 (citing Silveira,
312 F.3d 1053, 1066-67 & n.18 (9th Cir. 2003)). In that case, the Ninth Circuit determined
there was no standing because the Second Amendment does not confer an individual right.
See Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1066-67. Instead, the Parker court relied on the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Warth v. Seldin and its own decision in Waukesha v. EPA to defini-
tively establish that determining whether a plaintiff has Article III standing requires "as-
sum[ing] arguendo the merits of his or her legal claim." Parker, 478 F.3d at 377 (citing
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-02 (1975); Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235-36
(D.C. Cir. 2003)).
67. See supra notes 24-35 and accompanying text.
68. Parker, 478 F.3d at 381.
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lows that the Second Amendment also confers an individual
right.69
Agreeing with the rationale in Emerson, the Parker court pre-
sented the first part of the Second Amendment guarantee, "to
keep ... [a]rms," as a "straightforward term that implies owner-
ship or possession of a functioning weapon by an individual for
private use."7 ° The court concluded that the second part of the
guarantee, "to bear arms," was not limited to military service
and, in many historical contexts, suggested an individual right.71
Further, the court asserted that the right to bear arms pre-
existed the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights merely secured
that individual right.72
The amendment's relation to preserving a "well regulated mili-
tia" did not alter the Parker court's reasoning that the guarantee
clause conferred a personal right to bear arms.73 Drawing on the
second Militia Act of 1792, the majority explained that the Second
Congress understood a militia already existed as all free "able-
bodied men of a certain age," but still required organization into
units by the states. 74 This distinction was important to discredit
the appellees' argument that "a militia did not exist unless it was
subject to state discipline and leadership. '75 By eliminating the
state organization requirement for establishing a militia, the
Parker court defined the purpose clause as encompassing a wider
body of individuals independent of the state's right to raise a col-
69. See id. The court reasoned: "The Bill of Rights was almost entirely a declaration of
individual rights, and the Second Amendment's inclusion therein strongly indicates that
it, too, was intended to protect personal liberty." Id. at 383. See also United States v. Ver-
dugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990) (holding that "the people" is used uniformly
throughout the Bill of Rights).
70. Parker, 478 F.3d at 385-86 (citing United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 231,
232 n.31).
71. Id. at 384 (explaining that several founding-era state constitutions note the 18th
century public did consider bearing arms to be associated with self defense, and noting a
founding-era dictionary defined "bear" as "to carry," rather than in an exclusively military
connotation). The appellees contended that an original draft of the Second Amendment
included a conscientious objector clause for those religiously opposed to military service,
and this use indicates the phrase "bear arms" does have an underlying military purpose.
However, the court disposed of this theory because "there are too many instances of 'bear
arms' indicating private use to conclude the drafters intended only a military sense." Id.
72. Id. at 382-83 (explaining that it was well understood that the Framers kept guns
for self defense, hunting, and if the need arose, to overthrow a tyrannical government).
73. Id. at 389.
74. Id. at 387-88.
75. Id. at 386 (emphasis added).
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lective fighting force.76 "The important point, of course, is that the
popular nature of the militia is consistent with an individual
right to keep and bear arms."77 The majority concluded the "well-
regulated militia" clause was only intended to appease the Anti-
federalists who did not want standing armies to gain precedence
over state militias.78 Analysis of the combined purpose and guar-
antee clauses convinced the Parker court that an individual right
to bear arms was unequivocally intended by the Framers.79
3. The Supreme Court Has Ruled Implicitly That the Individual
Rights Model Is the Proper Interpretation of the Second
Amendment
Unrestricted by the lack of D.C. Circuit precedent, the Parker
court noted that the only Supreme Court guidance was not dispo-
sitive of a collective rights interpretation." Like the Emerson
court, the Parker majority found it indicative that the Supreme
Court in Miller did not rule in the government's favor on its pri-
mary theory-that the Second Amendment does not confer an in-
dividual right.8 " Instead, Miller "focused only on what arms are
protected by the Second Amendment ... and not the collective or
individual nature of the right."8 2 Essentially, the Parker court
understood Miller as applying the purpose clause to limit "arms"
to those used in militia service, rather than to limit the individu-
76. Id. at 389 ("The statute thus makes clear that these requirements were independ-
ent of each other, i.e., militiamen were obligated to arm themselves regardless of the or-
ganization provided by the states, and the states were obligated to organize the militia,
regardless of whether individuals had armed themselves in accordance with the statute.").
The court also noted that in state constitutional texts, it was "quite common for prefatory
language to state a principle of good government that was narrower than the operative
language used to achieve it." Id. (citing Volokh, supra note 2, at 801-07). The court used
this interpretation to conclude it was the "drafters' view that the people possessed a natu-
ral right to keep and bear arms, and that the preservation of the militia was the right's
most salient political benefit-and thus the most appropriate to express in a political
document." Id. at 390.
77. Id. at 389 (emphasis added).
78. See id. at 390.
79. Id. at 391. The court noted that the Supreme Court in Dred Scott v. Sandford, al-
luded to the individual right to keep and bear arms among the other reserved rights af-
forded to the states. Id. (citing Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 449-50 (1850)).
80. Id. at 393 (citing United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 224 (5th Cir. 2001))
(agreeing with Emerson's position that Miller does not support a collective or sophisticated
collective rights model, but does implicitly assume an individual rights theory).
81. Id. (citing Emerson, 270 F.3d at 221).
82. Id. (citation omitted).
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als covered by the Second Amendment. 3 Because the militia was
a broad set of all able-bodied men, it was necessary that they
bring their own weapons to serve. 4 Clearly, these were the same
weapons they would use in their private lives." If the Second
Amendment was not intended to protect the right to private
weapons, it would have had a "deleterious, if not catastrophic, ef-
fect on the readiness of the militia for action." 6 Accordingly, the
D.C. Circuit determined Miller's holding supported a protection of
private weapons, not necessarily limited to militia use, and,
therefore, supported the individual rights theory. 7
4. The Second Amendment Applies to the District of Columbia
The District and Parker's dissenting opinion advanced the the-
ory that because the District of Columbia is not a state, there is
no federalism concern under the Second Amendment. 8 Without
the issue of federal power threatening state militia organization,
the whole purpose of the amendment is moot and therefore can-
not apply to the District of Columbia. 9 The Parker majority dis-
carded this theory as an "appendage of the collective right posi-
tion" and because the language in the Second Amendment was
meant to safeguard a "hypothetical polity" or the country as a
whole, not the states alone. The District of Columbia is part of the
country and "the Supreme Court has unambiguously held that
the Constitution and Bill of Rights are in effect in the District."9"
Also indicative was the clear wording the Framers used when
they intended to discuss provisions applicable to individual states
in the Constitution. "With 'a free State,' we understand the fram-
ers to have been referring to republican government generally."'"
83. Id. at 394.
84. Id. (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939)).
85. See id.
86. Id.
87. Id. ("Miller's definition of the 'Militia,' then, offers further support for the individ-
ual right interpretation of the Second Amendment.").
88. Id. at 395, 405-09 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
89. Id. at 395, 406-07 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 395. The majority cited Madison's initial proposal for the amendment which
included the words "free country" instead of "free state," and suggested that Anti-
federalist Elbridge Gerry's criticism of the amendment's language indicated that he
thought the standing army would be used to protect the whole country, not the individual
states. See id. at 396.
91. Id.
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Because the Framers wanted to avoid creating a federal standing
army, they meant to include the entire country under the Second
Amendment.9 2 The Parker court concluded that the District of Co-
lumbia was "no less integral to that national function than its
state counterparts."93
B. Dissenting Opinion
In the dissent, Judge Henderson argued that the majority opin-
ion was dicta because "the District of Columbia is not a state
within the meaning of the Second Amendment and therefore the
Second Amendment's reach does not extend to it."94 The dissent
came to this conclusion by reading Miller as declaring the right to
bear arms only in relation to preserving the states' militias.9"
Judge Henderson further explained that "both the Supreme
Court and [the D.C. Circuit] have consistently held that several
constitutional provisions explicitly referring to citizens of 'States'
do not apply to citizens of the District."96 However, Judge Hen-
derson relented that determining whether the District is included
as a "state" under a certain constitutional provision ultimately
depends on the "character and aim of the ... provision. "9 Accord-
ing to the dissent, the Second Amendment does not have this
character. 98 Because the District is the seat of the federal gov-
ernment, it has no reason to obtain a military balance between
itself and the federal government.99 Therefore, the whole purpose
of the amendment is moot with respect to the District. 100
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 401-02 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (quoting Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F.
Supp. 2d 201, 239 (D.D.C. 2004)). Judge Henderson also disagreed that Heller had stand-
ing to challenge all three D.C. gun control laws and believed his license denial injury-in-
fact could only dispute the § 7-2502.02 registration statute. Id. at 402 & n.2.
95. Id. at 404 (citing United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)). Judge Hen-
derson also noted the Militia Clauses of Article I make a point to describe the militia of the
several states, rather than just the militia. Id. at 403-04 & n.6.
96. See id. at 406 (citing several cases that claimed the District of Columbia is not in-
cluded in the 14th Amendment, the Constitution's voting clauses, 11th Amendment, and
10th Amendment (citations omitted)).
97. Id. (quoting District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 420 (1973)).
98. See id. at 407 (citing Seegars v. Ashcroft, 297 F. Supp. 2d 201, 238-39 (D.D.C.
2004)).
99. Id. at 406-07 (citing Seegars, 297 F. Supp. 2d at 238-39).
100. Id.
[Vol. 42:807
PARKER V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
V. POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF THE PARKER DECISION
A. A Tempered Effect on Gun Control
At its most disabling effect on federal law, the Parker decision
will require that federal gun control provisions are necessary to
meet a compelling governmental interest. 1o This interest will not
create an impossible threshold for gun control laws to meet in the
immediate future. 102 Even the court in Emerson determined that
the U.S government could deprive an individual of his Second
Amendment rights with good reason.'03 However, the ruling will
make the D.C. Circuit a popular location for challenging federal
gun control laws and will produce increased opportunities for in-
dividual rights supporters to scrutinize and possibly overturn
federal laws.o 4
The challenged District of Columbia laws in Parker were
somewhat of an anomaly because they were so strict-effectively
banning all handguns.0 5 Most federal gun control laws do not
reach this level of restriction, but whether laws justify any depri-
vation of the individual right to bear arms is now at the discre-
tion of the courts. 106 State laws are insulated from the Parker de-
cision because the Second Amendment has not yet been
incorporated against the states. 107 For now, states can continue to
create gun control laws freely.
101. See Dorf, supra note 5, at 344-45 (explaining that the individual right can coexist
with the gun control if the rights "yield to the compelling interest in preventing violent
crime").
102. See Bruce Fein, Unalarming, Impeccable Ruling, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2007, at
A15. But see Dorf, supra note 5, at 344-45 (arguing that an individual rights view is likely
to impede strong gun control measures).
103. United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 261 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that the fed-
eral law restricting interstate gun sales to or from individuals under a restraining order
was not an undue restriction on the defendant's rights).
104. See Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/mov
abletype/archives/2007/05/circuit-denies.html (May 8, 2007, 12:31 EST) (quoting the Ap-
pellees' prediction if the Parker ruling stands).
105. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text.
106. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 399 (citing Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281-82
(1897)) (noting that laws "prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapqns does not offend
the Second Amendment" under an individual rights theory); Emerson, 270 F.3d at 261
(explaining that "limited, narrowly tailored specific exceptions or restrictions" on the right
to bear arms still can be enacted).
107. Parker, 478 F.3d at 391 n.13.
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B. Will the Supreme Court Finally Speak? And What Will They
Say?
Following the D.C. Circuit's en banc denial, l08 the Apellees pe-
titioned the Supreme Court to rule on the proper interpretation of
the Second Amendment." 9 Additionally, the five plaintiffs-
Parker, Ambeau, Palmer, Lyon, and St. Lawrence-who were
dismissed by the D.C. Circuit for the lack of standing, also peti-
tioned the Supreme Court in a separate certified question." 0 The
five plaintiffs asked the Court to review whether the D.C. Cir-
cuit's decision to refuse pre-enforcement challenges to the juris-
diction's gun laws conflicts with Supreme Court precedent.'11
After sixty-eight years of denials, the Court has accepted the
Second Amendment question on certiorari to resolve the recent
circuit split." 2 At their initial private conference on November 9,
2007, the justices chose to take "no action" on District of Colum-
bia v. Heller and Parker v. District of Columbia."3 The Court re-
considered these petitions on November 20, 2007, but only ac-
cepted the Appellees' question."4  The Court maintained a no
action decision on the five plaintiffs' cross-petition on standing
following this most recent conference." 5 Oral argument for Heller
108. Parker v. District of Columbia, No. 04-7041, 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 11029, at *4
(D.C. Cir. May 8, 2007).
109. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Parker, filed sub. nom., District of Columbia v.
Heller, 76 U.S.L.W. 3083 (U.S. Sept. 4, 2007) (No. 07-290).
110. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Parker, 478 F.3d 370, petition for cert. filed, 76
U.S.L.W. 3095 (U.S. Sept. 10, 2007) (No. 07-335).
111. Id. at i; see also Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.
com/wp/new-filings/dc-residents-seek-broader-right-to-challenge-laws (Sept. 10, 2007,
12:01 EST).
112. Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.coml wp/uncate
gorizedcourt-agrees-to-rule-on-gun-case#more-6178 (Nov. 20, 2007, 15:20 EST) ("Here is
the way the Court phrased the granted issue: 'Whether the following provisions-D.C.
Code secs. 7-2502.02(a)(4), 22-4504(a), and 7-2507.02-violate the Second Amendment
rights of individuals who are not affiliated with any state-regulated militia, but who wish
to keep handguns and other firearms for private use in their homes?'").
113. Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.comlwp/uncate
gorized/court-takes-no-action-on-gun-case/ (Nov. 13, 2007, 13:19 EST) (suggesting that
reasons for the delay on November 9, 2007 include: "one or more Justices simply asked for
more time to consider the . . . case[ 1"; "the Court may be rewriting the question or ques-
tions it will be willing to review"; or "the Court may have voted initially to deny review...
and one or more Justices are writing a dissent from the denial").
114. Supra note 113.
115. Id. ("The absence of any action may mean that the Court has decided not to hear
that case [Parker v. District of Columbia]. If that is so, it will be indicated in an order next
Monday[, November 26, 2007]. The Court also may simply be holding the case until it de-
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is scheduled for the week of March 17, 2008, perfect timing to put
gun control in the forefront of the presidential debates.116
Scholarship trends and the current ideology of the Court indi-
cate that the D.C. Circuit's Parker decision will be affirmed under
an individual rights theory. 1 7 The constitutional question of pre-
enforcement standing, if accepted on certiorari, is likely to be an-
swered in favor of the five D.C. citizen plaintiffs as well.'18 De-
spite the probability the Court will affirm Parker's position on the
individual rights theory, the issue of state law primacy and the
Bill of Rights would have to wait for another decision.1 9 Whether
cides the Heller case.")
116. Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog, http://www.scotusblog.com/wp/uncate
gorized/commentary-the-government-and-gun-rights/#more-6184 (Nov. 21, 2007, 10:37
EST).
117. Editorial, Fenty Wastes Effort on Guns, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2007, at A20
("David T. Hardy, an Arizona attorney who has written extensively about Second
Amendment law from an individual-rights perspective, predicted [D.C. Mayor] Mr. Fenty
would lose. He counted Justices John Roberts, Antonin Scalia, Clarence Thomas and
Samuel Alito in the pro-gun camp and said any of the five other judges could join them.");
Dorf on Law, supra note 112 ('On the merits, I count four just about certain votes to re-
verse (Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer), one likely vote to reverse on the merits (Ken-
nedy), two likely votes to affirm on the merits (Scalia, Thomas), one probably lean-
ing towards affirming (Roberts), and one unknown (Alito)."); Posting of Orin Kerr to The
Volokh Conspiracy, http://volokh.com/archives/archive_2007 11 18-2007 11 24.shtml#11
95588501 (Nov. 20, 2007, 14:55 EST) (Justice Kennedy tends to construe the Bill of Rights
so its protections apply broadly . . . [which suggests he] will conclude that the Second
Amendment does in fact create an individual right"); see Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d
1052, 1062 (2003) (explaining that Justice Thomas's concurrence in Printz v. United States
.suggested that he may well support the traditional rights view") (citing Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 938-39 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring)); Erin Sheley, Gun Fight at
D.C. Corral: A Victory for the Second Amendment, 12 WKLY. STANDARD 27, Mar. 26, 2007
(suggesting that Justice Scalia supports the individual rights view); Denniston, supra note
113 ("Some observers who read the Court's order closely may suggest that the Court is al-
ready inclined toward an 'individual rights' interpretation of the Second Amendment. That
is because the order asks whether the three provisions of the D.C. gun control law violate
'the Second Amendment rights of individuals.'"). But see Silveira, 312 F.3d at 1062 (ex-
plaining that Justice Stevens "strongly implied that he believes the [Second Amendment]
offers no obstacles to the federal government's ability to regulate firearms"); Sheley, supra
(acknowledging that neither Justice Alito, although dissenting in United States v. Rybar,
103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996), nor Justice Roberts have taken a stand on the Second
Amendment and that the "positions of the other justices also remain unclear").
118. Denniston, supra note 111 (explaining the petitioner's argument that the Court
has recently ruled that "[mierely because an individual has not violated a law to which he
or she objects does not mean that individual may not bring a pre-enforcement challenge");
see also Press Release, CATO Institute, Citizens in Gun Challenge Ask Supreme Court to
Reinstate Their Case Against the District of Columbia (Sept. 10, 2007), available at http://
www.earthtimes.org/articles/show/news-press-release,174647.shtml ("As a matter of
common sense and Supreme Court precedent, the government may not require citizens to
jump through meaningless hoops in order to have their civil rights claims heard in
court.").
119. Denniston, supra note 104; Denniston, supra note 113 ("But a ruling by the Court
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the Supreme Court would be willing to decide the two cases in
tandem to completely nullify the collective rights view is un-
known.
C. Applying the Second Amendment to the States
Although Parker signals the judicial trend recognizing a Sec-
ond Amendment individual right, neither Parker nor its Fifth
Circuit counterpart, Emerson, explored whether the amendment
applies to state action.'2 ° This distinction is vitally important.
Unless a court can scrutinize a state's laws under the Second
Amendment, there can be no constitutional control over the
strictness of the laws, regardless of the adoption of an individual
rights model. Originally, the Bill of Rights was only applicable to
the federal government,' 2 ' but after the enactment of the Four-
teenth Amendment and through the process of selective incorpo-
ration, most of the first eight amendments were deemed applica-
ble to state action.'22 However, the Second Amendment has not
been incorporated against the states. 123
Parker was able to skirt the difficult issue because the District
of Columbia "is a Federal District, ultimately controlled by Con-
gress. [It] is directly constrained by the entire Bill of Rights,
without need for the intermediary of incorporation."124 Emerson
did not need to resolve the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the
states because the defendant challenged a federal statute. '25 Al-
recognizing an individual right to have a gun almost surely.would lead to new test cases
on whether to extend the Amendment's guarantee so that it applied to state and local
laws, too.").
120. Parker v. District of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 391 n.13. (D.C. Cir. 2007) ("While
the status of the Second Amendment within the twentieth-century incorporation debate is
a matter of importance for the many challenges to state gun control laws, it is an issue
that we need not decide.").
121. See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) (holding that the Second
Amendment only applies to the federal government); Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243,
247 (1833) (holding that the Bill of Rights only applies to the federal government).
122. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 407 n.13 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
123. See id.
124. Parker, 478 F.3d at 391 n.13 (citations omitted); see also Liptak, supra note 4, at
A18 (explaining that Mr. Levy, the attorney for the Parker plaintiffs, chose to battle the
collective rights view by filing suit in D.C. because "questions about the applicability of the
Second Amendment to state laws were avoided because the district is governed by federal
law").
125. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 221 n.13 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining
that the incorporation of Second Amendment against the states does not affect any of the
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though not binding, the dissenting opinion in Parker suggested
that incorporating the amendment against the states is nonsensi-
cal because the original intention of the amendment was to pro-
tect the states from disarmament by the federal government.
126
Essentially, Judge Henderson implied that the Framers had no
intention of preventing the states from disarming their own citi-
zens. 1
27
Debate over the Second Amendment's application to the states
necessarily turns on whether there is an individual right to bear
arms in the first place.121 If the Supreme Court does find there is
a personal right, its next step would be to determine whether it
rises to the level of a fundamental right in today's society, analo-
gous to freedom of speech or freedom from unreasonable
searches,129 which would make incorporation against the states
appropriate. 13 This inquiry will require analyzing the Second
Amendment using the selective incorporation theories that justify
protecting a right within the Bill of Rights from overbroad state
action. 131
As such, it may take time before the Supreme Court is pre-
sented with a chance to revisit these themes, much to the chagrin
of individual rights supporters.
issues before the court).
126. Parker, 478 F.3d at 407 n.13 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
127. See id.
128. See McAffee & Quinlan, supra note 15, at 799 (explaining that if the Second
Amendment is viewed as an anachronism because the militias to which it applies no
longer exist).
129. Yassky, supra note 10, at 660, 663 (noting how the Court historically has given a
broad reading of fundamental rights to the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Eight Amend-
ments, but a much narrower reading to the Second, likely because the Second Amendment
fell outside the ambit of the New Deal, the period when individual liberties were judicially
expanded under the Bill of Rights).
130. Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest Stage of Originalism, 76
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103, 156 (2000) ("It would do no good to demonstrate conclusively that
the framers and ratifiers of those years really did regard a fundamental right to own
weapons as a necessary security against the danger of tyranny, if one could not at the
same time produce a compelling rationale for its incorporation today.").
131. Id. at 106-07 ("To be sure, full deployment of the individual rights interpretation
relies on ... invoking the incorporation doctrine of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Parker decision, and its likely Supreme Court affirmation,
holds that there is an individual right to own a firearm free from
undue government restriction. 13 2 This ruling has caused alarm
among states with gun control laws similar to those challenged in
Parker.'33 The lack of Second Amendment incorporation affords
states with gun control laws temporary insulation from Parker
and protects those state laws from immediate scrutiny by the
courts. 134 Federal laws, and D.C. laws, however, will have to meet
the burden of not infringing on the constitutional right.'3
The Parker decision illuminates the inherent deadlock in the
gun control debate. 36 Is it safer if guns are readily available for
individuals to protect themselves or if strict laws are enacted to
remove guns from the general population? 37 Particularly in the
aftermath of the Virginia Tech tragedy, the suggestion of leniency
in gun control appears undesirable considering that Virginia's
permissive laws enabled the shooter to obtain his weapons. 138 The
shocking account of New Jersey's school yard killings is a re-
minder that gun control laws are ineffective at reducing crimes
committed with illegally obtained weapons. 13 If or when the in-
dividual rights theory is affirmed by the Supreme Court and the
132. Parker, 478 F.3d at 395.
133. See James Oliphant, D.C. Gun Case May Hit Chicago, CHI. TRIB., Sept.5, 2007, §
1, at 3 ("If the high court were to endorse a broad view of the 2nd Amendment in the D.C.
case, it would be a short step for Levy and other gun-rights activists to argue that the
amendment also applies to such municipal ordinances as the Chicago ban."); see also
James Vicini, Hand Gun Ban Could Lead to Key Ruling, REUTERS, Sept. 6, 2007, http:l/
www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN0524618720070906 ("[T]he nation's three
largest cities-New York, Chicago and Los Angeles-have laws banning handguns or
tightly regulating their possession and use.").
134. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
136. See Parker, 478 F.3d at 399 n.17 (noting that the amici point out how easily
criminals can acquire guns while "D.C. gun control laws irrationally prevent only law
abiding citizens from owning handguns").
137. See Leslie Eaton & Michael Luo, Shooting Rekindles Issues of Gun Rights and Re-
strictions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2007, at A20 (presenting gun control's two schools of
thought reflected in the aftermath of Virginia Tech tragedy-that the victims, if allowed to
carry guns, could have protected themselves, and that if gun control was stricter the vic-
tims' need for protection would never have become necessary).
138. See id. (explaining how the Virginia Tech shooter obtained his guns legally and
that "Virginia is second in the nation in the ease of getting handguns").
139. See Editorial, Getting a Handle on Guns, STAR-LEDGER (Newark), Aug. 17, 2007,
at 20 ("[Plolice and prosecutors say few crimes in Newark are committed with legally
owned guns, so registration isn't going to have a serious practical effect.").
[Vol. 42:807
2008] PARKER V. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 829
Second Amendment is incorporated against the states, the real
concern will be whether courts will allow lawmakers to ade-
quately restrict these rights or permit individuals to dictate their
own versions of gun control.
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